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Cyber Security in Control of Grid-Tied Power
Electronic Converters–Challenges and
Vulnerabilities
Subham Sahoo, Member, IEEE, Tomislav Dragičević, Senior Member, IEEE and Frede Blaabjerg, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Grid tied power electronic converters are key en-
abling technologies for interfacing renewable energy sources,
energy storage, electrical vehicles, microgrids and high voltage
dc transmission lines with the electrical power grid. As number
of power converters in modern grids continually increase, their
monitoring and coordinated control in a way to support the
grid have become topics of increased practical and research
interest. In connection with this, latest standards have also
defined mandatory set of control parameters for grid-tied con-
verters, which should be adjustable by a remote entity that
sends commands through a communication network. While such
remote control capability allows many new control functions in
grid tied converters, it also renders them vulnerable to cyber
attacks. The aim of this paper is first to shed light on portions of
the power converter control systems that are vulnerable to cyber
attacks. Next, typical cyber-attacks are overviewed by considering
different applications of grid-tied converters. Further, the impact
of different types of cyber attacks on grid support functions
is studied. Finally, the paper is concluded with summary and
recommendation for further research.
Index Terms—Voltage source converters (VSCs), Cyber-
physical systems, Distributed generation, Cyber attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the most important global technological goals inthis century is to realize carbon-neutral electrical power
systems. This will not only reduce the pollution and global
warming effects, but will also decrease the overall societal
dependency on insecure supply of fossil fuels. Large-scale
adoption of renewable energy sources (RES) like wind and
photo-voltaic (PV), energy storage systems (ESSs), electrical
vehicles (EVs) and high-voltage dc (HVDC) transmission
systems are seen as crucial initiatives to reach this goal [1].
Grid-tied voltage source converters (VSCs) play a key
role in this scenario, since they serve as the most common
energy conversion interfaces between these technologies and
the electrical power grid [2]. It is also worth mentioning that
VSCs enable the formation of intelligent microgrids (MGs),
which are seen as intermediate aggregation entities that can
operate either in stand-alone mode or facilitate large-scale
integration of distributed energy resources in grid-tied mode
[3], [4]. However, as the number of VSCs in renewable-
based power grids increase, their influence on performance
of such grids also becomes more pronounced. With the grid
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modernization being carried out swiftly, multiple VSCs are
being integrated into the existing utility network to yield grid-
supportive services.
Further, with the ever-increasing convenience of remote
control capabilities using information communication tech-
nologies (ICT), the flexibility of operation and robustness of
control of VSCs has greatly improved. The integration of these
facilities have actually led to a plight, which creates a direct
trade-off between efficiency, reliability and security for larger
interconnected network of VSCs. In fact, such large scale
monitoring using supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) makes it highly susceptible to malicious intrusions.
Moreover, the reliability factor involved with deep integration
of the communication layers to achieve coordination also play
a vital role in new security concerns. Such threats ranging
from thefts, cyber attacks may result in system shutdown,
cascaded failure, damage to the consumer loads, endangered
energy market operation, etc. [5]. Many cyber accidents of
power blackouts in Brazil have been reported in [6], such as
the SQL Slammer worm attack, the Stuxnet attack and various
industrial calamities. Furthermore, it has been claimed in the
McAfee Report [7] that 80% of the utility companies have
undergone at least one denial of service (DoS) attacks in their
communication network with 85% of units’ data infiltrated by
an adversary. As the most prominent mode of communication
in smart grids is wireless, IT security clients are managing
various data protection plans to handle the unreliability of data
transmission systems. However, intelligently modeled cyber
attacks with plentiful system information creates disparity in
securing the electric grid as they easily bypass the model
verification tests [8]. It emanates additional vulnerabilities in
the smart grid from a control systems perspective, albeit the
newly IT secure verification methods.
Intelligent attacks often target the physical layer to ma-
neuver the system stability as concealed disorder and un-
certainties. Accounting considerable timescale separation of
control stages of VSC under a value of no more than 0.1
seconds, this mandates detection of cyber attacks in a timely
manner to avoid unnecessary system casualties. Apart from the
said casualties, it also breaches confidentiality and optimality
of system operation almost immediately on one hand. On
the other hand, as the penetration of intelligent attacks go
on in a stealth manner, which goes undetected by control-
theoretic solutions, the attacker may initiate the attack during
slightly alarming conditions to arrange an extreme case of
system shutdown. Such cases are brought into perspective
considering planning alternatives and power back-up options.
Hence, appropriate design of reliable, resilient and intelligent
control methodologies for VSC needs to be the current focus
to tackle such critical security issues.
For the purpose of better understanding of security problems
in power electronics based cyber-physical systems, this paper
discuss the following:
1) control and operational challenges faced by the VSCs
used in different applications due to cyber attacks.
2) a brief overview of the vulnerabilities in the control and
cyber layer of VSCs (in grid-connected and standalone
mode) is provided. Further, more aspects on how it
disorients their operation from the state of normalcy is
detailed.
3) directions and viewpoints, especially in the design of
resilient control formulation for VSCs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Typical
structure of a power electronic based system with a detailed
overview on their various roles is presented in Section II. The
impact and vulnerability analysis of the control, communi-
cation and physical layer used to handle VSCs are revealed
in Section III. Further, the challenges faced due to cyber
attacks for different VSC applications are demonstrated using
few case studies in Section IV. Finally, the conclusions and
recommendations for future research are given in Section V.
II. CYBER-PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE OF POWER
ELECTRONIC CONVERTERS
A typical architecture of individual ac grid-connected
voltage-source-converter system is shown in Fig. 1. The over-
all power conversion chain consists of several stages, i.e. the
input stage, input-side power converter stage, dc voltage stage,
the grid-tied VSC stage, the ac grid stage and the cyber stage.
This type of power electronic architecture is most commonly
used for interfacing RES like wind and PV [9], ESSs [10] and
EV charging infrastructure with the electric power grid [11].
With aims to improve the resiliency and robustness of smart
grids, it is expected that in the near future individual VSC sys-
tems will be interconnected together through communication
links into a singular all-inclusive cyber-physical smart grid.
Aforementioned control stages are briefly described below:
A. Physical Stage
The exemplary input power sources/sinks are located on the
far left side of Fig. 1. Some units in the input stage such as
grid or ESS can either inject or absorb the electric power.
The power exchange between the input side and the interme-
diate dc stage is regulated by the input-side converters. These
converters process the power exchange between the input stage
and the dc voltage stage. Further, DC stage serves as a power
buffer between the input and the ac stage. It can also operate
independently from the ac stage, e.g. as a dc microgrid [12].
To integrate the sources from input stage into the grid, grid-
tied VSC serves as an interface between the dc-link stage and
the ac electric power grid.
Their output is connected through the interface filter either
to an ac electrical power grid, ac microgrid, or to standalone
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Fig. 1. Control and physical stages in an individual grid-tied voltage-source-
converter (VSC) system.
ac loads, as shown in Fig. 1. Based on its interconnection with
different AC stages, various standards are applicable. For elec-
tric grid, the primary concern lies with the regulation of grid
current with high power qualitative signatures during transients
(voltage sags, swells and unbalances) [13]. Recently, increas-
ing number grid-ancillary services related to grid voltage and
frequency support are also required [13]. On the other hand,
their performance in an inertia-less autonomous system (e.g.
microgrids) is essentially governed using sharing capabilities
for active and reactive power, harmonics during steady-state
as well as transients, etc. These objectives are met owing
to the primary control associated with the abovementioned
quantities, which will be discussed later in this paper.
B. Cyber Stage
We assume that smart grid as a whole comprises of numer-
ous VSCs described in the previous section. They, together
with conventional synchronous generators, jointly regulate the
grid and each of these units is termed as an agent for an
exemplary portion of a smart grid with interconnected VSCs.
4
1
2
331 2 4
Central 
Controller
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Communication topologies: (a) Centralized control, (b) Distributed
control.
A communication network connects the sensors and con-
trollers co-existing in the smart grid. Each agent communicate
in two ways: (a) to a central controller and, (b) among each
other in a distributed manner. A pictorial description of both
the cyber structures is provided in Fig. 2, where the dotted
lines represent the flow of information. Since the control
objectives is highly vulnerable to single point-of-failure in
centralized network as shown in Fig. 2(a), the distributed
control philosophy [14] in Fig. 2(b) is prominently used for
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vulnerable control layers against cyber attacks.
power electronics based cyber-physical systems to enhance
reliability and scalability.
Every agent has a distributed controller that processes data
from local and neighboring agents, as well as from other
remote sites. These data are normally obtained by phasor
measurement units (PMUs), which comprises of dynamic
voltage phasors. Communication between the PMUs and local
controllers can be achieved in centralized fashion, where
measurements from all the agents are collected centrally
for processing and decision making. The most prominent
method of coordination between agents, SCADA system is
usually employed [15] to alleviate monitoring in smart grid
networks. If the number of agents is high, this approach not
only requires significant communication resources, but it is
also prone to potential cyber-attacks. Other option, commonly
referred to as decentralized control, refers to a scheme where
only local measurements are used. While the communication
infrastructure is completely avoided here, control capability
is limited. As already explained above, a distributed con-
trol paradigm introduces flexibility since the computational
resources are uniformly dispersed across the system to achieve
coordination. Hence, low bandwidth communication channels
can be employed to achieve the same function. Though it pro-
vides an obvious criteria of assessment of intrusion attempts,
vulnerability to cyber attacks can not be necessarily guaranteed
for coordinated attacks [16], [17]. This can be explained owing
to insufficient information present in each node, which does
not serve as adequate global information for detection of cyber
attacks.
Considering the control layer, a brief overview of the control
functions of ac-grid-tied VSCs in accordance with their time-
scales are presented in Fig. 3. It can also be noticed that some
control loops in Fig. 3 are depicted next to each other, which
indicates that they are operated simultaneously (e.g. active
damping and ac current control [18], dc-link voltage control
and synchronization [19], or a fault-ride through and virtual
impedance/admittance control [20]). More discussion on the
secure and vulnerable control layers of VSC will be carried
out in the next section after providing a brief theory on cyber
security.
C. VSC Roles
VSCs roles in renewable-based power systems and micro-
grids can be divided into three main categories, i.e. grid-
feeding, grid-forming and grid-supporting [21]. These roles
are discussed in more detail below:
1) Grid-feeding Unit: The function of a grid feeding VSC
is to inject specified amount of current into the grid. Therefore,
they can be represented as current sources, as shown in
Fig. 4(a). From the implementation point of view, they typi-
cally comprise an outer dc voltage control loop, a dedicated
synchronization unit and an inner current control loop with
embedded active or passive damping [22]. For generating the
current reference, outer power controllers can also be used to
supplement the dc voltage controller.
2) Grid-forming Unit: The function of grid-forming VSCs
is to regulate the local voltage. Therefore, it can be represented
as an ideal voltage source, as shown in Fig. 4(b). Due to its
stiff voltage regulation, this type of units can be considered
as a master in the system that defines the local ac grid.
Therefore, grid-forming VSC does not need to have any power
sharing capabilities and dedicated synchronization. From the
implementation standpoint, grid-forming VSCs are typically
realized via outer voltage loop and an inner current loop [23].
This functionality is typically employed as a basic philosophy
in stand-alone applications, such as microgrids [24].
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Usually for paralleled VSCs in stand-alone microgrids, a
primary control law is employed for both active and reactive
power to align the frequency ω∗ and voltage references V ∗
respectively for synchronization using:
ω∗ = ωref −mp(P − P ∗) (1)
V ∗ = Vref − nq(Q−Q∗) (2)
where ωref , Vref , P ∗ and Q∗ are the global frequency,
voltage, active and reactive power references respectively.
Moreover, mp, nq , P and Q denote the active power droop,
reactive power droop, measured active and reactive power
respectively.
3) Grid-supporting Unit: As opposed to the first two
categories, grid-supporting VSCs involve broader spectrum
of control functionalities, from grid voltage/frequency sup-
port, active/reactive power sharing to virtual inertia and
impedance/admittance emulation.
III. IMPACT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF CYBER
ATTACKS ON CONTROL OF VSCS
A. Cyber-Security
With the proliferation of communication technologies, cyber
disturbances are becoming a reality. As already witnessed
in numerous real-world examples, such disturbances can sig-
nificantly affect the performance of smart grids. With fast
increase in penetration of VSC technologies, their impact
on the system is reaching a point where the impact of
cyber attacks cannot be ignored. In particular, researchers
are focused on designing secure control methodologies apart
from the traditional encryption based techniques. Generally,
spoofing attacks can be caused on sensors and communication
links, where the signals are either interrupted, quantized or
coerced. To name a few, false data injection attacks (FDIAs)
is caused by injection of auxiliary signals or changing the
content in the measurements reported by the sensors [25].
When a similar activity is recognized in the communication
links, it is commonly referred to as the man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack [26]. Moreover, jamming of signals can also
be caused to interrupt the transmission of signals, which is
commonly known as denial of service (DoS) attack [27]. These
are some of the prominent attacks that has precipitated in the
real-time applications. More details on other critical intrusion
approaches, which are the subsets of the abovementioned
attacks, can be found in [28].
To familiarize with the said intrusion approaches, cyber
attacks can be conducted on sensors, smart meters and load
aggregator in an active distribution network to dismantle
system objectives such as, frequency regulation based ancil-
lary services, voltage stability, power flow management, etc.
Further, any adversarial outbreak into the cyber channels using
various techniques, such as jamming the flow of information,
altering the communicated measurements, deactivating cyber
link(s) can instill system shutdown. The cautious nature of
such attacks depends on various factors such as the degree of
system information acquired by the attacker and the ability of
the attacker to penetrate into the system particulars.
Accounting the implementation of these control layers in
real-time processors, intrusion into the control layer only
allows access to the reference set-points (dc-link voltage,
frequency) during run-time instead of the inner control layers.
As the inner loops are compiled into the read-only memory
(ROM) section of the processor, intrusion into the sensor
values can not dissemble the system operation. However, the
system dynamics will vary when the references are changed
to trigger instability or activation of the protection layer.
Mathematically, this can be explained using the state-space
representation of ith VSC for:
ẋi(t) = Axi(t) +Bui(t)
yi(t) = Cxi(t) +Dui(t)
(3)
∀i ∈ N , where xi = [vg ig P Q vdc]T and u =
[ω∗ vdcref P
∗ Q∗ E∗]T with the state parameters denoted
by grid voltage, grid current, active power, reactive power, dc
voltage respectively; and the input consisting of the reference
parameters of frequency, dc voltage, active power, reactive
O
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Fig. 5. Attack detection filter law - Trajectories outside r̄ denote the presence
of cyber attack.
power and inverter voltage for ith VSC respectively. Further,
x ∈ RN , u ∈ RM , y ∈ RS , A ∈ RNxN , B ∈ RNxM ,
C ∈ RP xN and D ∈ RP xM . Without loss of generality,
we assume that each state and output variable can be in-
dependently compromised by an attacker. An attack signal
ξi(t) ∈ RP+N depends specifically upon the attack strategy.
If Σ = {ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξN+P } is a null vector, then the system
response is unbiased. To detect the presence of cyber attack
elements, a residual signal r : R≥0 → RP test can be followed.
It is worth notifying that ξi is not a design parameter; as it
completely depends on the intent of the attacker.
Remark I: The nature and magnitude of attack signal can
be bounded/unbounded; and is completely dependent on the
motive of the attacker. However, the design of corrective
control measures to ensure a resilient system is always done
regardless of the nature of attack.
To detect attacks using a centralized attack detection filter
based on a modified Luenberger observer, the estimated dy-
namics of ith VSC with known initial states x(0) can be given
by:
˙̂xi(t) = (A+GC)x̂i(t)−Gyi(t)
ri(t) = Cx̂i(t)− yi(t)
(4)
where x̂i(t) denote the estimated states. Further, x̂i(0) = xi(0)
and the output injection matrix G ∈ RNxP is such that (A+
GC) is Hurwitz.
Remark II: ri(t) ≤ r̄ if and only if ξi(t) = 0 for t ∈ R≥0;
where r̄ is an infinitesimal value. It is intuitive from Fig. 5 that
the normal residual test is passed for the violet trajectory since
the residual value remains within the threshold r̄. Detailed
proof can be referred from [8].
Otherwise, it can be concluded that an attack element is
present in the ith VSC. As such attacks cause a change in the
system response due to altered model, the residual element
overshoots out of the shaded circle in Fig. 5 with radius
r̄. Hence, any physical disturbances such as load change,
faults, line outage will always obey Remark II since the
model dynamics will always be unaltered using the unbiased
measurements during these disturbances.
On the other hand, the inner control loops are resilient
to cyber attacks as it operates with a tracking objective for
each state. It is worth notifying that the inner control loop is
resilient to cyber attacks only when the outer control loop is
unattacked, as shown in Fig. 3. Since the secondary control
layer exploits communication to alter the references for outer
control loop, any bad data injection into the upper control
layer (highlighted with red in Fig. 3) will disorient stability or
cause system shutdown. The shutdown is usually caused due
to the unintentional activation of over-voltage and over-current
protection layers.
Extending this theory for interconnected VSCs, the artificial
dynamics created by the attack element can be nullified in (3),
only when:
N∑
i=1
ξi = 0 (5)
holds true. Further, these attacks in the attack set Σ can be
categorized as undetectable from the monitors, if and only
if x ∈ RN such that ||sI − A||0 + ||Cx||0 = φ, where
|Σ| = φ. Such attacks are commonly termed as coordinated
attacks, since they easily bypass the attack filters in (4).
Using (5), it can be extended that the control inputs can
either be manipulated in the controller or on communication
link(s) by an external entity. As the cyber and control layer
are closely coupled, the susceptibility to cyber attacks aggra-
vates for an interconnected system of VSCs. With increase
in attack-vulnerable points, the ancillary support provided
by interconnected VSCs can be easily misled, leading to
system collapse. Such consequences eventually cause techno-
economic catastrophes by maligning the electric network with
the injection of false data attack vectors into cyber-physical
layer. Hence, a detailed vulnerability analysis on the control
of VSCs due to cyber attacks has been studied in detail in the
following subsection.
B. Vulnerability Analysis of Cyber Attacks on Control of VSCs
1) Grid-forming control for VSCs: A conventional control
structure for the grid-forming VSCs is shown in Fig. 4. As
already explained, grid-forming VSCs regulate voltage and
frequency locally. To synchronize with other AC sources, the
general philosophy is to align primary droop control locally
using the available measurements. From a cyber-space per-
spective, this decentralized arrangement is considerably safe
as it is difficult for the attackers to access the physical layer.
Moreover, suitable physical layer security alternatives such as
beamforming is commonly used these days [29]. However,
decentralized control philosophies suffer from an operational
point of view in matching the commercial regulatory standards
[30]. This drawback has been conceived usually by secondary
controller using the information from other VSCs. Referring to
the cyber structure from Section II-B, distributed or centralized
secondary control architectures can be imposed on the primary
control law to compensate for the offsets. However, this
leaves a large vulnerable space for the attackers to locate the
attacked data either into the sensors, communication link or
the controller. Below are some of the common methods of
intrusion approaches to manipulate each component:
• Sensors: The sensors’ data are usually manipulated by
penetration of the adversary inside the control platform.
This penetration can be easily achieved by Trojan Horse
[31] to use remote systems as host. The sensor output
from the acquisition panel is usually within signed 15 V.
To calibrate it against the actual measurement, acquisition
gains using a linear plotting theory is used. The attacker
usually attempts on changing the acquisition gains, which
creates a bias in the reported measurements.
• Communication Links: The communicated data can
be manipulated either inside the controller or in the
communication stage involving a router/encoder/decoder.
There are several ways in which the transmitted data can
be manipulated, such as authorization violation, interrup-
tion of transmission of signals, illegitimate opening of
information logs, replaying the transmitted information
from the past, etc.
• Controller: As mentioned already, the controller can be
illegitimately accessed using Trojan Horse to change the
reference input(s) used either in the outer control loop or
secondary controller for control of VSCs.
2) Grid-feeding and supporting control for VSCs: Grid-
feeding control for VSCs are basically employed to inject
active and reactive power into the grid-forming units. This
philosophy is mostly used in grid-connected applications for
integrating renewable energy sources [3]. To ameliorate grid-
supportive services, the desired control inputs are added to
the overlaying grid-forming controller, as shown in Fig. 7.
As detailed in the previous section, the reference input vdcref
or sensor vdc is usually vulnerable to cyber attacks, which
allows the attacker to either limit or increase the power flow
from VSCs thereby creating a stability/coordination issue in
the network. Moreover, the outputs of grid-supportive services
Pgss and Qgss can also be compounded with false data
to misinform the controlled units. The vulnerable points of
attack in the control of grid-forming and grid-feeding VSCs
are summarized in Table I. It is worth notifying that the
measurements/references, denoted as xj , are transmitted by
other units to the upper level control either responsible for
grid-supportive services or for secondary control objectives.
Using the vulnerable hotspots in control systems for VSC,
the challenges faced due to cyber attacks in different fields
have been studied in detail to project system outage, non-
optimal operation, economic feasibility, instability, consumer
discomfort, etc.
IV. GRID-SUPPORTIVE SERVICES BY MULTIPLE VSCS:
CHALLENGES FROM CYBER ATTACKS
In the previous section, the vulnerable points of cyber attack
in control of VSCs have been briefly discussed. Building upon
the said theory for conventionally modeled cyber attacks, this
section will introduce the challenges faced by single/multiple
VSCs in different fields due to cyber attacks to meet the grid-
supportive services. It is worth notifying that the reference
frequency f∗ for all the considered cases in this paper is
equal to 50 Hz. As a consequence, ω∗ = 314.16 rad/s.
Moreover, since the focus of this paper is based only on
evaluating different control principles for VSCs in the presence
of cyber attacks, each attack scenario is carried out considering
the system and control parameters from the paper(s), which
are consistently highlighted in the caption of results of the
respective case study.
abc-αβ  
Sa Sb Sc
+
_
Lf
Lf
Lf
Cf Cf
Cf
ifαβ  vfαβ   
ifa
ifb
ifc
iga
igb
igc
VSC
vdc
Lfg
Lfg
Lfg
vfa  
vfb  
vfc  
vfαβ ,ref  vf control
(w or w/o modulator)
ifαβ  vfαβ   
Power 
calc.
Lg
Lg
Lg
igαβ   
vfαβ   
Pout   
Qout   
Zv(s)
igαβ   abc-αβ  abc-αβ  
igαβ   
E· sin(ωt)
kP
kQ
+
_
_+
+_
_+
P
*
Q
*E
*
ω
*
ωm 
E
1/s
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 
C
o
n
tro
lle
r
Psec   
Qsec   
+
+
Cyber 
Graph
Cyber 
Attack
L
in
e
a
r/N
o
n
-
L
in
e
a
r
 L
o
a
d
s
Fig. 6. Basic V − f control of Grid-forming VSCs: black and red dotted lines represent the communication layer and attack elements injected into
sensors/communication link respectively.
PWM
Sa Sb Sc
+
_
Lf
Lf
Lf
abc
αβ 
Cf
Cf
Cf
igα  
ifa
ifb
ifc
iga
igb
igc
VSC
Grid
igβ  
Lfg
Lfg
Lfg
Curent 
loop
∑ 
igα,ref  
igβ,ref  
PLL
͠ 
θg  
I
φ 
Lg
Lg
Lg
∑ 
AD
Ref. 
gen P loop
Q loop
∑ 
vdc loop
PQ 
calc
∑ 
∑ 
Q
P
vdc
∑ 
vdcref
abc
αβ 
Cyber 
Attack
Grid Supportive 
Services
Pgss   Qgss   
Fig. 7. Basic P − Q control of grid-supportive VSCs: black and red dotted lines represent the communication layer and attack elements injected into
sensors/communication link respectively.
TABLE I
VULNERABLE POINTS IN CONTROL STAGES OF DIFFERENT VSC TYPES
Current control (Inner) Outer control Secondary controller Grid-supportive services
Grid-feeding × vdc, vdcref × ×
Grid-forming × P ∗, Q∗ DoS
1/MITM 2 attack on vj , ωj 3
FDIA 4 on vi, ωi, Psec, Qsec
×
Grid-supporting × × × Pgss, Qgss, ω∗, E∗
1 Denial of service, 2 Man-in-the-middle, 3 ◦j denote communicated measurements, 4 False data injection attack
A. Frequency Response and Wide Area Damping Control
As introduced before, grid frequency control can be sup-
ported by the VSC local control system. In fact, modern grid
codes require converters to stay connected and to continue
exchanging the power with the grid under moderate frequency
deviations and rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) [13].
Moreover, VSCs must be equipped by static frequency-power
droops to continually adapt to frequency variations. The im-
plementation of such static frequency-power droop functions
can be done as an outer controller with respect to virtual
impedance loop [32], [33] using:
ωm = −
Pout − P ∗
kp
+ ω∗. (6)
where kp is the frequency-power droop. Moreover, ωm,
Pout, P ∗ and ω∗ denote the primary frequency control output,
measured active power, active power reference and reference
for grid frequency, respectively. Although it provides reduced
frequency nadir, static frequency-power droop characteristic
does not increase the inertia of the system. In this context,
virtual inertia emulation controllers have been increasingly
proposed as viable substitutes for static droop controllers [34],
[35], [36]. It has been shown in [?] that both controllers
have identical steady-state performance, but virtual inertia has
additional swing-equation type dynamics that allows reduced
ROCOF, as follows:
P ∗ − kp(ωm − ω∗)−Pout = Jωm
dωm
dt
+D(ωm − ωg), (7)
where J , D and ωg are inertia, damping constants and mea-
sured phase locked loop (PLL) grid frequency, respectively. If
these constants are set to zero, (7) becomes equivalent to (6).
An exemplary implementation of virtual inertia emulator in
the outer control loop coupled with the filter voltage controlled
VSC in the inner loop is shown in Fig. 8.
Moreover in (7), only local measurements are used to
emulate the synthetic inertia. However, it has been shown that
improved damping of frequency oscillations can be achieved
by supplementing the local control law with measured vari-
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ables from other locations in the system [37]:
P ∗−kp(ωm−ω∗)−Pout+uc = Jωm
dωm
dt
+D(ωm−ωg) (8)
where uc is the supplementary control signal that can be
defined as follows:
uc = −αi(ωg − ω̄). (9)
Here αi is a tunable parameter, while ω̄ is the average fre-
quency in a given cluster of VSCs that can be computed either
in centralized or distributed way. In this way, the ancillary
features provided by networked VSCs can be an asset to the
management and stability of power networks.
(a) DC voltage under compromised virtual inertial response
(b) Active power under compromised virtual inertial response
Fig. 9. Performance of virtual inertial response by VSCs [37] under attacks
on frequency (controller attack) and DC voltage (sensor attack).
A brief overview on impact of cyber attacks on ancillary
services is provided in Fig. 9. Owing to the frequency response
from VSCs such as EV charging parks, the increase/decrease
of active power setpoint corresponding to the change in grid
frequency (from 50 to 49.5 Hz at t = 0.12 s) can be
manipulated by the following FDIAs: (a) controller attack on
frequency (ω), and (b) sensor attack on DC voltage sensor.
These FDI attacks are basically carried out using the intrusion
approach into the controller (as explained in Section III(B)) by
adding a DC bias to the sensed measurement vdc via the data
acquisition unit or to ω obtained via PLL; thereby manipulat-
ing the control theory with illegitimate measurements. It can
be seen in Fig. 9 that the virtual inertial response under attacks
is subjected to further dip in DC voltages, thereby leading to
decrease in active power generation. Assuming a uniform vir-
tual inertial response based control strategy for interconnected
VSCs, any false data intrusion into frequency/DC voltage
contravenes the system objectives to provide grid supportive
services and may even lead to instability.
B. Coordinated Voltage and Reactive Power Control
Large scale integration of renewable energy sources owing
to their intermittent nature often cause violation of voltage
regulatory limits [38]. Such violation may lead to disconnec-
tion of VSCs and possibly voltage stability problems [39].
Several local voltage control strategies for VSC are discussed
in [40]- [41]. However, an optimal operation is achieved only
by tuning the local parameters centrally with a day-ahead
prediction of renewable energy sources and load profile. More-
over, the day-ahead forecasting error could go large leading to
uncoordinated control in many cases. To address these issues,
robust multi-step voltage control mechanisms [42], [43] have
been devised to provide reactive power support from VSCs
under such scenarios. Basically, these control mechanisms for
local reactive power support operate to minimize tap changes
of on-load tap changer (OLTC) based on the minimum and
maximum voltage setpoints. Another primary goal is to limit
the voltage fluctuation inside a narrow band.
The prediction of node voltage in a distribution network
considering the sensitivities of voltage with respect to reactive
power Q, active power P and the number of tap changes Np
can be done using:
V (k + 1) = V (k) +
∂V
∂Q
∆Qpv(k) +
∂V
∂P
∆Ppv(k) +
∂V
∂Np
∆Vp(k) (10)
where ∆Ppv is a vector of predicted change in PV power at
various PV locations whereas ∆Qpv and ∆Vp are the control
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(c) Reactive power from each VSC under attack.
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(d) Reactive power from each VSC under normal conditions.
Fig. 10. Impact on United Kingdom General Distribution System (UKGDS)
{test system can be found in [44]} due to false data injection on bus voltages
in bus 1175 [42], [43].
variable to arrest the node voltage within the targeted limits.
Considering a maximum reactive power limit for each VSC
of 0.436 pu. for voltage ranging between [1, 1.05] pu., the
objective function to maintain the voltages under specified
limits using the control variable ∆u(k) = [∆Qinv(k),∆Vp(k)]
can be given by:
min
N−1∑
i=0
(∆u(k + i)RuT (k + i)) (11)
where, R is a diagonal weight matrix to penalize the desired
control variable.
A case study is done in Fig. 10 to analyze the steady
state voltage stability when false data is injected into the
bus voltage of one of the nodes. A 11 kV United Kingdom
General Distribution System (UKGDS) [44] is employed as the
test distribution network to analyze the impact of centralized
voltage regulatory schemes. Since day-ahead PV forecasting
may introduce large error in case of uncertain events, robust
voltage control mechanisms have been devised to handle these
uncertainties. As per the grid code compliance, PV based VSC
systems start providing reactive power as an immediate solu-
tion to voltage recovery within the hard bound limits. However,
compromised voltage measurements from each node represent
a biased depiction of the reactive power requirements.
As shown in Fig. 10(a), when an attack of 0.04 pu is injected
into the voltage measurement in bus 1175, the reactive power
from each VSC increases which results in increased average
voltage profile as compared to the unattacked scenario in Fig.
10(b) & (d). Under worse circumstances of large false data
injected into the system, it may diverge outside the maximum
voltage threshold, leading to unnecessary operation of OLTCs.
Moreover, it leaves out the available reactive power reserve
with interconnected VSCs, which are primarily assigned for
voltage support as per grid-code compliance. On the other
hand, a coordinated set of attack can also be modeled, which
passes bad data detection test, such that the network operator is
unaware of the presence of any attack elements. These attacks
may reduce the optimal efficiency of the distribution system
leading to over-utilization of back-up resources.
C. Optimal Energy Management
Energy management system (EMS) is an effective mech-
anism to handle the generation profiles of different sources
while attaining their economical benefits [45], [46]. To date,
generation dispatching is usually carried out in a centralized
manner to minimize the operational cost using hierarchical
stages of optimization including, integer programming [47],
artificial intelligence based techniques [48], etc. To achieve
more flexibility in control under issues such as transmission
delay and information failure, distributed controllers with
robust performance towards cyber layer imperfections have
been preferred in recent times [49]. As opposed to longer time
scales with static demand input in the centralized scheme,
distributed dispatching allows online actions for every load
change in real-time [50]. As a result, it improves the economic
profile for optimal utilization of resources.
The active power control in each VSC is augmented with
frequency restoration to minimize the generation cost for
economic operation. To this end, we consider the general
quadratic cost function for each DG to provide the operational
cost, given by:
Ci(Pi) = aiP
2
i + biPi + ci (12)
where ai, bi and ci are the cost coefficients of ith VSC.
Following the generation-demand balance equality constraint,
the objective of optimal load sharing is to minimize the total
cost of all DGs using:
min C(P ) =
N∑
i=1
Ci(Pi) (13)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
Pi = PD, P
min
i < Pi < P
max
i (14)
where PD, Pmini and P
min
i denotes the total demand in the
microgrid, minimum and maximum active power for ith DG
respectively. Further, (13) can be solved using its associated
Lagrange function as:
Lλ =
N∑
i=1
Ci(Pi) + λi(PD −
N∑
i=1
Pi) (15)
where λi is the Lagrangian operator. Differentiating (15) with
respect to Pi using the first-order optimality condition, we
obtain the incremental cost as:
λi = 2aiPi + bi (16)
To minimize the total generation cost subject to the equality
constraints, it is required that the incremental cost of each VSC
to be equal [51], which is carried out using a power correction
term ∆Pi, given by:
∆Ṗi =
∑
j ε Ni
aij(λj − λi) (17)
In (17), each agent is represented via a node and a com-
munication digraph via edges using an adjacency matrix
A = [aij ] ε R
N×N . The communication weights are given
by:
aij =
{
> 0, if (xi, xj) ε E
0, else
where E is an edge connecting two nodes, with xi and xj
being the local and neighboring node respectively. The final
active power reference for each DG can be designed by adding
(17) to P ∗ in Fig. 6 to achieve the desired optimal response.
To increase the generation cost, any adversarial false data
in the cooperative ED optimization model is categorized as
a data integrity attack (DIA). Such attack alters the power
flows with respect to the optimal solution. Basically using the
DIA, the local incremental cost λi is updated in every iteration
using:
λi(k + 1) = λi(k) +
∑
j ε Ni
wij(λj(k)− λi(k)) + uaλi (18)
where uaλi is an exogenous attack input in i
th VSC. This can
be done by changing the cost parameters in the local VSC
using:
uaλi =
{
∆aiPi, if uaλi = f(Pi)
∆bi, else
(19)
where ∆ai and ∆bi denote positive quantities, when added to
the cost parameters in (16) increase the generation cost per
unit power and fixed cost, respectively.
(a) Active power of all DGs under attack.
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(c) Incremental cost of all DGs under attack.
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(d) Incremental cost of all DGs under normal conditions.
Fig. 11. Comparative evaluation of active power, and incremental cost of DGs
under no attack and DIA attack [50] – Change in cost parameters causes a drift
in the convergence of incremental cost λ causing a non-optimal operation.
From the perspective of an adversary, the goal is to increase
the generation cost by hacking critical parameters and leading
to a reduction in the energy efficiency of the system [52].
Such attack vectors will create economic loss for the operator.
In the context of a cooperative real-time ED, the final state of
convergence ensures unbiased operation inside the constrained
optimization space.
To provide with the basic understanding of such attacks,
a case study on a microgrid with N = 4 VSCs in Fig. 6
is done using a DIA with increase in the cost parameters
of unit 2. It can be seen that the system states achieve
consensus despite the presence of DIA. The realism behind
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Fig. 12. Cyber attack on the communication channel of Unit II [49] –
Synchrony among VSCs is disturbed leading to instability.
its operation under such attacks is unknown considering a
particular agent since adequate information on the total active
power demand is not centrally available. Moreover, it can be
seen in Fig. 11(c) that the steady state value of the incremental
cost initially upon attacks is raised by 0.85 $/W at t = 1 s
as compared to the normal unattacked scenarios shown in
Fig. 11(b) & (d). It clearly suggests that minimization of
(13) is violated under attacks for the same loading condition.
Hence, the abovementioned case study raises serious concerns
on detecting and mitigation of such attacks in cooperative
microgrid, since the local neighborhood error in (17) converges
to zero. As a result from a techno-economic perspective, such
attacks cause reduction in energy efficiency.
D. Distributed Active Power Sharing in Autonomous Micro-
grids
Using a setup of N = 4 grid-forming VSCs shown in
Fig. 6, a man-in-the middle (MITM) attack is conducted
on ω2 by injecting an attack element of 8 rad/s into the
outgoing communication links from unit II. Following the
cooperative synchronization law in autonomous microgrids
[49], frequency restoration and average voltage regulation are
the two objectives, which govern stability. Using the active
power primary control law for grid-forming VSCs [3], the
active power among the DGs are shared equally for equal
active power droop mp. However, due to injection of false
data into ω2 of 8 rad/s at t = 2.5 s in Fig. 12, the synchrony is
disturbed leading to instability. Hence, such attacks can lead to
shutdown of small standalone powerhouses such as microgrids,
and thereby affecting its operation.
E. Cyber Attack in VSC Based HVDC Stations
With increasing demand, the evolution of microgrids is
surfacing to facilitate integration of renewable energy sources.
However, power extraction from renewable energy sources
depend on a lot of suitable socio-environmental factors, such
as temperature, area of installation, wind, etc. Under implau-
sible circumstances, transmission of power has been made
possible using high voltage DC(HVDC) by means of two-level
VSCs. More details on multi-polar and multi-level topologies
of VSCs used for HVDC transmission can be found in [53]. As
compared to the line commutated HVDC solution [54], VSC-
HVDC provides many features such as independent control
of active and reactive power with black start capability. The
(a) DC Voltage (pu) in VSC-HVDC.
(b) Active Power (pu) via DC link in VSC-HVDC.
Fig. 13. Cyber attack on station II in VSC-HVDC [53]: (a) DC voltage, (b)
Active power – FDIA to cause undervoltage causes oscillatory instability.
control philosophy of VSC-HVDC is quite commonly a set of
grid-feeding VSCs with one station following P −Q control
whereas the other station with DC voltage regulation.
To demonstrate the impact of cyber attacks in 200 MVA,
± 100 kV VSC based HVDC, a FDI attack is injected into
the DC voltage sensor in station II at t = 0.85 sec in Fig. 13.
As soon as the attack is initiated, DC voltage drops to 0.9
pu, which creates oscillatory instability for the same droop
value. Hence, such attacks raise critical concerns of stability.
Moreover, it could lead to activation of protection devices
installed in both HVDC stations.
F. Impact of Cyber Attack on Wind Farms
1) Role of STATCOM: As potentially large installations
of VSCs in grid-tied applications include wind farm, many
robust and reliable control strategies have been designed to
extract maximum output [55]. However, traditional wind farms
with squirrel-cage induction generators (SCIG), where its
stator is directly connected to the grid need large capacitor
banks for reactive power to be absorbed by the IGs. If the
reactive power requirement increases, it is withdrawn from
the grid. Since the wind farms are usually connected to a
25 kV distribution network, excess withdrawal of reactive
power deteriorates the voltage profile. To prevent this, static
compensators (STATCOMs) are usually connected at the PCC
to provide reactive power support to the wind farm [56].
To exploit under-utilization of STATCOM, a false data
injection attack is initiated in the AC voltage sensor at t = 12
sec as shown in Fig. 14. As AC voltage measurement reports a
false bias as an undervoltage scenario, reactive power injection
from the grid increases. As a result, the STATCOM with 3%
droop setting starts absorbing the reactive power. Moreover
with a L-G fault on the line at t = 15 sec, the peak reactive
power demand from STATCOM under normal and attacked
(a) AC Voltage at the PCC.
(b) Reactive Power Demand of each WT.
(c) Reactive Power from Grid.
(d) Reactive Power from STATCOM.
Fig. 14. Performance of SCIG based wind farm under normal conditions and
attack: Reactive power requirement from the grid increases unnecessarily due
to FDIA on AC voltage [56].
conditions vary as a matter of grid code for fault ride through
capability of every grid-connected unit [57].
2) Role of Grid Side Converter in Doubly-Fed IG (DFIG):
With enhanced control flexibility, the DFIG technology allows
extracting maximum energy from the wind for low speeds by
optimizing the turbine speed while regulating the mechanical
stress on the turbine. Moreover, the active power capacity is
also increased by 40% as a virtue of the AC/DC/AC bridge
using two back-to-back VSCs [58]. The function of the rotor
side converter (RSC) is to extract maximum power from the IG
based on the power-tip speed ratio graph [59]. Following this
stage, the grid side converter (GSC) regulates the DC voltage
to wheel the power from RSC into the grid.
(a) Generated active and reactive power from DFIG.
(b) DC voltage and speed.
Fig. 15. Impact of FDIA on DC voltage sensor in GSC of DFIG [58]:
Overvoltage protection above 1600 V DC, resulting into tripping.
 
(a) Active power profile under normal conditions.
 
(b) Active power profile under MITM attack.
Fig. 16. Impact of MITM attack in centralized home management system
[60]: Unnecessary scheduling from grid leading to increased consumer ex-
penses.
Using the pre-defined set of vulnerable points in Table I,
the DC voltage sensor is attacked with a large value of 400
V at t = 10 sec in Fig. 15. As DC voltage reaches 1600 V,
it ultimately affects the control dynamics in the GSC, which
leads to tripping owing to the overvoltage threshold. Hence,
simpler attacks on the outer layer control loop can lead to
shutdown or tripping of a large renewable generating unit,
thereby challenging the reliability of operation.
G. Cyber Attack in Home Management System
With increased utility tariff rates, a battery empowered
residential unit is a mandate requirement for grid-supporting
units to enhance reliability under grid outage scenarios. Hence,
proper power management using batteries is usually monitored
and controlled by a centralized home energy management
system (HEMS) [60]. The battery is basically connected as an
auxiliary source, which is programmed to charge when there’s
surplus power from PV or discharge when there’s excess load.
This greatly reduces power utilization from the grid to deliver
monetary benefits to the community. However, intrusion into
the active generation profile of any source/load may disorient
the control objective. This has been briefly shown in Fig. 16,
where the load profile is manipulated using a MITM attack.
With initialization of the attack, the battery stops responding to
the surplus/deficient power locally. As a result, the grid power
profile changes accordingly leading to non-optimal solution.
H. Voltage Regulation by DSTATCOM
To manifest practical scenarios of cyber attacks in power
electronics based systems, a real-time simulation is carried
out in OPAL-RT simulator OP5600 to demonstrate how cy-
ber attacks on AC voltage measurement disorients the volt-
age regulation control action by a DSTATCOM (Distribu-
tion static compensator), as shown in Fig. 17 [61]. Fig. 18
shows the conceptual diagram of the real-time simulation
process, where RT-LAB software is used as the interface
between MATLAB and real-time OPAL-RT simulator. The
MATLAB/SimPowerSystems model is loaded on to OPAL-
RT through the RT-LAB and the real-time data is obtained
conversely. To reduce the computational burden for each core,
the model is split into three subsystems, i.e. a subsystem
comprising of the physical layer (power unit), another subsys-
tem comprising of control layer for the real-time simulation.
Further a subsystem is employed, which includes console units
to display real-time measurements. As shown in Fig. 18, the
cyber attack is conducted on the control unit, which affects
the system operation. In this way, an adversary can potentially
penetrate into the host control unit to alter the actual controller
by injecting false data and disregard the normal operation.
As shown in Fig. 17, a DSTATCOM is used to regulate
voltage on a 11 kV distribution feeder connected to un-
balanced and reactive power loads by either absorbing or
generating reactive power. The DSTATCOM is programmed
to provide reactive power support to regulate voltage when it
increases/decreases by ± 6%. When simulated under real-time
environment in Fig. 18, it can be seen that the DSTATCOM
responds normally in Fig. 19(a) by absorbing and generating
reactive power into the network with decrease and increase in
voltage at t = 0.1 and 0.2 s, respectively. However, when an
attack element of 0.1 p.u. is introduced into the control system
at t = 0.2 s, it can be seen in Fig. 19(b) that the reactive
power generated for both cases is considerably different. In
fact, when the voltage is restored back to normal at t = 0.3
s, DSTATCOM continues to inject reactive power into the
network, which will lead to overvoltage conditions. Further,
this attack impedes over-utilization of resources, as shown in
Fig. 19(c). To counter such attempts, the conventional state-
estimation technique is exploited using (3)-(4) to extract the
residual element; thereby indicating a significant change in
the model parameters to confirm the presence of an attack.
This has been clearly shown in Fig. 19(d) where the residual
element goes out of bounds r̄ to indicate the presence of an
attack element in either of the vulnerable points (highlighted
in Table I).
Usually in practical cases, such security mechanisms will
be implemented on top of the existing controller to study the
observability. As soon as the presence of attack is confirmed,
the pre-attack measurement(s) will be held to operate using
the last unbiased set-point [62]. This is the most simple coun-
termeasure that can be applied to power-electronics systems;
which can assure system recovery in milliseconds. It should be
noted that the abovementioned mitigation criteria is limited to
the magnitude of attack with varying performance. However
to completely remove the attack element from control system,
resilient control strategies need to be developed for power
electronic systems such that it guarantees resilient and robust
operation to tackle all security concerns in power electronics
based systems [63], [64].
Finally, to accommodate the basics of impact due to all
the discussed cyber attacks, the attack methodologies on
different grid supportive services by VSC based systems are
overviewed in Table II. As evident from the system impact
and behavior in Table II, a generalized attack detection and
mitigation strategy needs to be developed to provide a resilient
networked control norm. Moreover, system observability needs
to be accommodated to design a cyber attack resilient control
mechanism to alleviate security in the modern electric grid.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE SCOPE OF WORK
In this paper, the challenges and vulnerabilities associated
with the control of modern grid-tied power converters due to
cyber attacks have been analyzed from the system standpoint.
At first, basic local control principles used for VSCs in
different fields and applications have been revised. Then, an
overview of potential attacks and their impact on intercon-
nected converters has been provided. A detailed tutorial on
the vulnerable points in the control and communication layer
used for control of VSC is provided. Using these attack
models as a proof of concept, many test cases considering
VSCs in various fields such as DFIG, HVDC, STATCOM,
DSTATCOM, microgrids, etc. are performed to demonstrate
the consequences of cyber attacks. It has been demonstrated
that cyber attacks with minimum sophistication can result into
system shutdown, cause instability and potential damage to
the consumer appliances. To address these concerns, attack
resilient control strategies need to be devised to mitigate
impact of cyber attacks on the electrical grid as a future scope
of work. The design of resilient strategies requires appropriate
understanding of the control and protection layer. From an
ideal point of view, eliminating communication channel to
promote localized control strategies would facilitate security
of the power electronic converters. However, this idea propels
as an overstatement from the performance perspective. Hence,
it is important to restrict the cyber-physical interactions to a
minimum synergy by targeting a manageable trade-off with
system performance. Robust and resilient control strategies
using watermarking [65] and model-verification techniques
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TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF CYBER ATTACKS ON GRID SUPPORTIVE SERVICES BY VSC BASED SYSTEMS
Grid-Supportive Services Attack Methodologies System Impact
Virtual inertial response
by EV Charging Parks
Attack on frequency (FDIA,
DoS, MITM) and DC voltage (FDIA)
Unnecessary tripping caused by RoCoF relays,
causing unintentional islanding
Reactive power support by
STATCOMs, PV based VSCs
Attack (FDIA, MITM) on voltage(s),
Coordinated attack can cause severe impact
Manipulated voltages provide unneccesitated reactive
power, thereby affecting the voltage profile
which puts penalty on power distributors
Scheduling and dispatch Attack on active power dispatch (FDIA)and data integrity attack (DIA) on cost parameters
Sub-optimal operation; may diverge to the
active power generation bounds
Demand side management Attack on load consumption pattern(FDIA, MITM, DoS)
Conditions where overloaded conditions are
manipulated as normal loading level, leads to lifetime
deterioration of transformers and lines; poor performance
Target OPAL-RT OP5600
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Fig. 18. Real-time setup to demonstrate practical feasibility and impact of
cyber attacks to disregard voltage regulation by DSTATCOM.
[66] could be an asset to infiltrate such cyber attacks in real-
time. Accommodating these view-points, the development of
resilient technologies and preparing a line of defence against
the cyber attacks is a new goal to enhance security and
reliability of the dominant power electronic converters in the
electric grid.
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Tomislav Dragičević (S’09-M’13-SM’17) received
the M.Sc. and the industrial Ph.D. degrees in Elec-
trical Engineering from the Faculty of Electrical
Engineering, Zagreb, Croatia, in 2009 and 2013,
respectively. From 2013 until 2016 he has been a
Postdoctoral research associate at Aalborg Univer-
sity, Denmark. From March 2016, he is an Associate
Professor at Aalborg University, Denmark where he
leads an Advanced Control Lab.
He made a guest professor stay at Nottingham
University, UK during spring/summer of 2018. His
principal field of interest is design and control of microgrids, and application
of advanced modeling and control concepts to power electronic systems. He
has authored and co-authored more than 170 technical papers (more than 70
of them are published in international journals, mostly IEEE Transactions) in
his domain of interest, 8 book chapters and a book in the field.
He serves as Associate Editor in the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUS-
TRIAL ELECTRONICS, in IEEE Emerging and Selected Topics in Power
Electronics and in IEEE Industrial Electronics Magazine. Dr. Dragičević is a
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